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MARTIN REUSS*

Coping With Uncertainty:
Social Scientists, Engineers, and
Federal Water Resources Planning
ABSTRACT
The growingpopularity of multipurpose water managementencouraged by a great many engineers- in the early 20th century led
to the callfor severely rationaliststudies of regional socialand physical characteristics.To analyze what, where, and when multipurpose
projects were needed, the federal government hired economists, geographers,and politicalscientists. "Planning"became the watchword,
and by 1965 that activity occupied a sizable number of social and
physical scientists in the federal government. Since passage of the
National EnvironmentalPolicy Act in 1969, with its requirementfor
environmental impact statements, naturalscientistsalso have become
an important part of water resources planning,for they must determine both immediate and long-term environmental impacts. The net
result of these changes is that the role of the engineer has changed in
the planning process. This, in turn, has contributed to changes in
organizationalculture andfocus. This articleexamines and evaluates
the evolving water resources planningprocess and shows how that
process has affected professionaland organizationalrelationships,the
design of water projects, and the theory of water management.
Throughout the twentieth century, and especially since the Great
Depression, social scientists have influenced federal water resources planning in the United States. Primarily, political scientists, geographers, and
economists have focused on the optimal administrative machinery and
planning region; comprehensive short- and long-term planning objec*Senior Historian, Office of History, United States Army Corps of Engineers. B.A. 1966
Pennsylvania State University; M.A., Ph.D. 1971 Duke University. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect those of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
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tives; and methods of evaluating potential projects.
Success has been most evident in this last area, for benefit-cost
analysis, long a mainstay of water resources planning, depends on the
gathering and interpretation of socioeconomic data. Nevertheless, social
scientists generally have failed to convince engineers that social systems
must be studied as carefully as natural systems prior to constructing a water project. Moreover, changing values and orientation among both engineers and social scientists have increased tensions between the two groups
despite federal laws and regulations that basically mandate cooperative
efforts.
At the beginning of the century, social scientists and engineers
were closer in spirit. Both groups sought systematic principles to guide
them to better planning and to improve society.2 Both believed that those
blessed with experience, training, and moral virtue should administer.
Once problems were resolved, once "laws" were discovered, there would
be no need for new answers. In succeeding decades, and particularly after
World War II,engineers became more modest about their ability to discover such laws, but they retained their faith in an ordered universe, albeit far
more complex than once envisioned. In contrast, many social scientists
abandoned the search for any objective laws because it meant excluding
concern with values. They turned their attention to examining the connections between individual and group behavior and between the environment and human activity.3 Rejecting the Spencerian determinism that
dominated their profession's early years, they attempted to identify the
conditions under which choices are made and objectives determined.
There was also in this reorientation an implicit concession-one that many
physical scientists also now grant 4-that the world is chaotic and often unpredictable. This approach may be more practical and intellectually rigorous, but among water planners it has strained relations between productoriented engineers and social scientists, whose seemingly insatiable appetite for data often impressed engineers as unreasonable, if not outrightly
obstructive.
The social science focus on values and choice impaired relations
with engineers in another way. Civil engineers proudly observed their
completed projects and took satisfaction in human manipulation of na-

1. No consensus evidently exists on what fields are to be considered social sciences. In
addition to those already mentioned, anthropology, psychology, and sociology are usually
included. History, in particular, exists on the fringes of social science but is not necessarily
part of it.
2. W. Nelson, The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1890 at 86 (1982); E. Layton, Jr.,
The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession
66(1971).
3. R. Hinkle, Jr. & G. Hinkle, The Development of Modem Sociology 47-69 (1954). See
Ross, The Development of the Social Sciences, in The Organization of Knowledge in Modem
America, 1860-1920 at 107-38 (A. Oleson & J. Voss eds. 1979).
4. See J.Gleick, Chaos: Making A New Science (1987).
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ture. They boasted of the direct flood control, irrigation, navigation and
hydropower benefits that their works produced, but, until the last twenty
or thirty years, rarely reflected on what alternatives their projects denied.
Unlike engineers, social scientists saw no intrinsicvalue to any project. The
value lay in the alternative use of resources. They regarded engineering as
only one of several tools to be used in regional development and left open
the possibility that the best option may be no development at all.
We cannot be certain that the use of social science has produced
better water projects. We assume it has, but without systematic evaluations of the consequences of water resources projects,"post-audits",we
simply do not know how well we plan.5 Unfortunately, very few evaluations have been done. Nevertheless, it remains important to understand
both the capabilities and limitations of the planning process. Countless
monographs testify to the influence of politics and public values in this
process, but the process also responds to changes in professional expertise.
Social scientists themselves occasionally have assessed their discipline's contributions to our understanding of water resources development.6 However, their analyses often blur the distinction between
monographs about water resources and those that actually apply social
science knowledge to specific policy issues. Somewhat surprisingly too,
social scientists have not carefully considered the effect of their methodologies on the professional culture of engineers who actually design water
projects. Finally, few social science assessments show sensitivity to the historical dimension; the period discussed is generally limited to the author's
own career. By focusing on the impact of social science on twentieth century federal--especially Army Corps of Engineers-water resources planning and policies, this article illuminates an inadequately appreciated part
of the natural resources history of the United States. Significant historical
work on this topic remains to be done.
THE BEGINNING: ECONOMICS WITHOUT ECONOMISTS
The American dream of egalitarian economic expansion came to
an end at the beginning of this century. Drastically reduced public lands
5. Gilbert White has been the foremost proponent of post-audit evaluations, although the
idea can be traced back to mid-century. White, When May a Post-Audit Teach Lessons?, in The
Flood Control Challenge: Past, Present, and Future: Proceedings of a National Symposium,
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 26,1986 at 53-63 (H. Rosen & M. Reuss eds. 1988). See R.
Haveman, The Economic Performance of Public Investments: An Ex Post Evaluation of Water
Resources Investments (1972).
6. Man & Water: The Social Sciences in Management of Water Resources (L. James ed.
1974). In successive chapters, John W. Bennett, Stephen C. Smith, Gilbert F White, Henry C.
Hart, and Sue Johnson examine the impact of anthropology, economics, geography, political
science, and sociology, respectively. Id. James himself is an engineer. See also L. James & J.
Rogers, Economics and Water Resources Planningin America, in 105 Proc. Am. Soc. Civil Engineers, Water Res. Planning & Mgmt. Div. 47-64 (1979) (for a succinct overview of the subject).
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and sharply rising population evoked a distressing vision of a population
outrunning food production. Lumbermen and miners voiced concerns
about diminishing timber supplies and dramatic increases in iron and petroleum use. Neglected waterways, demands for hydropower throughout
the country, and calls for irrigation projects in the West drew particular attention to the nation's water resources. Enthusiastically supported by
President Theodore Roosevelt, multipurpose partisans advocated the application of scientific management to insure efficient water use. This
meant a program of basin-wide development that would address all potential applications of the resource. 7 Of the social sciences, economics appeared to offer the most to multipurpose development. At the May, 1908,
White House Conference of Governors, convened to discuss conservation
planning, Dr. Edmund J. James, president of the University of Illinois and
a charter member of the American Economic Association, said, "The questions before this Conference are primarily in our opinion, economic questions... questions of so organizing and utilizing our national resources as
to produce in the large and long run the greatest return in the form of material wealth to the Nation."8 Given the growing recognition that America's natural wealth must be husbanded, and the increasing popularity of a
"systems approach" to management in the country, 9 economists could optimistically envision increased demands for their service. Scientific management would guide the future development of the nation's natural
wealth, including water resources, and economists would operate the
twin keys to success: scientific efficiency and administrative cooperation.
However, the practice of involving social scientists in public administration, first attempted in Wisconsin just after 1900, was not easily
transferred to Washington. Theodore Roosevelt prized character over in7. N. Wengert, The Administration of Natural Resources: The American Experience 28-33
(1961); S. Olson, The Depletion Myth: A History of Railroad Use of Timber (1971); M. Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography 331-52 (1989); S. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 at
5, 27-48 (1959). Inland Waterways Commission, Preliminary Report, S. Doc. No. 325, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1908) (includes a statement by Theodore Roosevelt to the Inland Waterways Commission on Mar. 14, 1907, which illustrates his support of multipurpose development).
8. Proceedings of a Conference of Governors in the White House, Washington, D. C., May
13-15,1908 at 174 (W.J. McGee ed. 1909). See these proceedings for the origins of this extraordinary conference, which included political leaders, academicians, representatives of professional societies, and bureaucrats. Id. at v-xii. See also C. Van Hise, The Conservation of
Natural Resources in the United States 5-7 (1910); Our Natural Resources and Their Conservation 6-7 (A. Parkins & J. Whitaker eds. 1939); H. Huth, Nature and the American: Three
Centuries of Changing Attitudes 185-88 (1972).
9. T. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm,
1870-1970 at 184-248 (1989). Hufschmidt, Systems Analysis, in 16 Water Res. In & Econ. Dev.
In the South, Agric. Pol'y Inst. Series 81-90 (1965) (on the early application of systems analysis to water resources planning).
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tellect and remained suspicious of intellectuals despite his interest in efficient government. Woodrow Wilson, who came from an academic
background, nevertheless did not think "experts" made particularly good
administrators. Opposition also came from suspicious congressmen, who
habitually scuttled any proposals to transfer legislative prerogatives to
professional administrators. lOMoreover, despite experiments with national planning and multidisciplinary analysis during World War I, in somnolent postwar Washington, economists and other social scientists turned
their attention to changing the process rather than basic institutional structures.1 lTheir interest in natural resources issues waned, 12 and this created
a paradox in water resources planning. On one hand, conflicting water
needs drew public attention to related economic and social questions. On
the other, the economists left the field largely to the engineers, who willingly expanded their professional responsibilities, especially if it meant
enhancing their positions as managers. 13 Engineers continued to dominate, not only the design and construction, but the planning of water developments.
Social questions touched all federal water agencies during the
1920s. Dating back to the Gallatin report of 1808, Congress generally had
supported public works whose benefits were "annual additional income
to the nation".14 However, as more and more projects were approved following the Civil War, it became evident that many projects were of questionable national benefit. In 1920, Congress instructed the Corps of
Engineers to report on the local and general benefits of proposed projects
and to recommend whether local cooperation should be required. While
the Corps' subsequent analyses generally satisfied Congress, it was not
10. N. Henry, The Emergence of PublicAdministrationas a Field of Study, in A Centennial History of the American Administrative State 40-50 (R. Chandler ed. 1987); D. Waldo, Politicsand
Administration: On Thinking about a Complex Relationship, in A Centennial History of the
American Administrative State 91-96 (R. Chandler ed. 1987); Hays, supranote 7, at 4,109-14
(et passim); R. Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life 199-213 (1963); Wengert,
supra note 7, at 37.
11. 0. Graham, Jr., Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon 9 (1976); T. Haskell,
The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and
the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority 86-87 (1977); Ross, supra note 3, at 107-38; Hofstadter, supra note 10, at 199-213; Waldo, supra note 10, at 93.
12. W. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American
Economic Policy, 1921-1933 at 15-22 (1985); Graham, supra note 11, at 13; P.Warden, A History of the National Resources Planning Board, 1933-1943 at 1-37 (1979); Clements, Herbert
Hoover and Conservation, 1921-33, 89 Am. Hist. Rev. 67-88 (1984); D. Swain, Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-1933 (1963).
13. D. Noble, American By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977).
14. A. Gallatin, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Subject of Public Roads and
Canals Made in Pursuance of a Resolution of Senate, of March 2,1807 at 1 (1808).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

until after World War II that the agency decided to hire economists to do
the work. 15
Social and economic questions also rose in the Bureau of Reclamation. Even reclamation engineers admitted that too much emphasis had
been placed on the purely engineering phases of reclamation and not
enough on the "human engineering" issues, as Elwood Mead, the new
Commissioner of Reclamation, called it in 1924.16 A "Fact Finders" report,
written by Bureau of Reclamation engineers, surveyed reclamation history
and concluded that planners must evaluate economic and social, as well
as engineering, feasibility when selecting projects. Congress made this
mandatory in legislation passed in 1924.1/ In 1929, Alvin Johnson, editor
of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, concluded that "[rieclamation is a
policy immensely worth continuing, if it moves forward, as the times require, from its engineering achievement to equally distinguished achievements in the art of community building." 18 In 1927, Congress directed the
Corps to prepare general multipurpose plans to improve navigation, water power, flood control, and irrigation on the Mississippi River and alluvial valley.19 Despite its reservations about multipurpose development,
the Corps responded with alacrity-and without social scientists. The resulting so-called "308 reports," named after the House document in which
the cost estimates for the reports first appeared, provided basic data for
multipurpose development for decades to come. 2UHowever, no social scientists addressed regional economic and social issues, and little thought
was given to long-term growth. Engineers surveyed the rivers and gathered whatever data they could, sometimes resorting to rough calculations
and intuition in traditional engineering fashion. Economics had become
important; economists had not.
15. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1920, 33 U.S.C. § 547 (1988); W. Holt, The
Office of the Chief of Engineers of the Army: Its Non-Military History, Activities, and Organization 99-111 (1923) (outline of organization of the Corps); Willeke, Social Aspects of Water
Resources Planning,in Proc. Am. Soc. of Civil Engineers, supra note 6, at 84; Transcript, interview with B.Joseph Tofani (Feb. 10,1988) (conducted in Palm Coast, Florida, by M. Reuss and
available in Office of History, Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia; this depository will hereinafter be cited as OH, HQ USACE). Tofani was the
first "supergrade" in the Corps of Engineers. He is now retired.
16. C. Hynning, Water Planning 25 (1937) (draft manuscript chapter submitted to the
Water Resources Committee) (available in file on "Water Resources Committee Progress
Report, 1935--1939," Gilbert F. White papers, OH, HQ USACE. The White papers are currently being inventoried, and file identification is tentative).
17. Id. at 25-26. See D. Dawdy, Congress in Its Wisdom: The Bureau of Reclamation and
the Public Interest 28-29 (1989); W. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation 64 (1973); A. Golze,
Reclamation in the United States 28-29 (1961); Swain, The Bureau of Reclamation and the New
Deal,61 Pac. Northwest Q. 137-38 (1970).
18. Hynning, supra 16, at 27.
19. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1927, 33 U.S.C. § 702 (a) (1988).
20. House of Representatives, Estimate of Cost of Examinations, Etc., of Streams where
Water Power Appears Feasible, H.R. Doc. No. 308,69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
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THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PLANNERS

Although the 1920s saw little governmental promotion of social
programs at the national level, an increasing number of students entered

the social sciences during the decade. In the two years 1920-21, a total of
108 Ph.D.s and 678 M.A.s 2 1 were awarded in economics, political science,
and sociology. By the years 1928-29, the number had climbed to 357
Ph.D.s and 1,496 M.A.s. The increasing numbers reflected and contributed
to the growing stature of social scientists. "Prediction is the aim of the social sciences as it is of the physical sciences," confidently-proclaimed Uni-

versity of Chicago sociologist Ernest W. Burgess in 1929.2 That same year,
the economist Beardsley Ruml observed that "high administrative officers
and commissions are coming to depend on studies, and on information
and advice from social scientists, just as they depend on the expert services
of engineers." 23 Ruml's mentioning of engineers could hardly have been
casual. At the dawn of the New Deal, they remained the example par ex-

cellence of experts in government.
Ruml himself played a critical role in helping to prepare social sci-

entists for publi administration responsibilities. As director of the general
education fund of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (amalgamated
with the Rockefeller Foundation in early 1929), Ruml offered essential financial support to the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), founded in
1923 largely through the efforts of his former professor at Chicago and lifelong friend, Charles E. Merriam. 24 The Ruml-Merriam relationship was
mutually beneficial. It brought financial stability to the SSRC, and,

through the council's largess, stimulated social science research, including
work on water resources. Not incidentally, it provided the financial re-

sources that made Chicago--the city and the university-the most innovative social science laboratory in the country.

While Ruml linked money and academia, Merriam bridged academia and politics. Professor of political science at the University, Chicago
21. H. Odum, The Development and Application of the Social Sciences and Social
Research 13 (unpublished draft, William E Ogburn papers, box 16, folder 1, Dep't of Special
Collections, The Joseph Regenstein Library, U. Chi.; this depository will hereinafter be cited

as UC).
22. Burgess, Is PredictionFeasible in Social Work? An InquiryBased Upon A Sociological Study
of ParoleRecords, 7 Social Forces 533 (1929) (copy in Ernest W. Burgess papers, box 191, folder
2, UC). Burgess never lost his faith in social science to predict. Indeed, much of his professional career was spent searching for "prediction instruments." Guide to Burgess papers and
lectures presented by Burgess on Theory and Methods of Predictions in the Social Sciences
(1937-38) (four lectures, box 193, folders 5 and 6, Burgess papers, UC).
23. Speech by B. Ruml, Recent Trends in Social Science, at dedication of the Social Science
Research Building of the University of Chicago (Dec. 17,1929) (Charles Merriam papers, box
CXLVIII, folder 8, UC).
24. B. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics 125-33 (1974); E. Sibley, Social Science Research Council: The First Fifty Years 3 (1974). See Rockwell, Institutions-SocialScience
Research Council, 32 Environment 2-4 (1990).
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alderman for a number of years, and unsuccessful candidate for mayor of
Chicago in 1911, Merriam was a Progressive Republican who understood
the political constraints placed on the actual application of social science.
Elected as president of the American Political Science Association in 1921
and founder of the behavioral movement in political science, he was a respected classroom teacher as well as social science practitioner. Harold L.
Ickes directed his mayoral campaign, which ended in narrow defeat. The
enduring friendship of the two men brought Merriam to Washington in
1933, when Ickes became the new Secretary of the Interior.25 In turn, Merriam recruited other University of Chicago social scientists to the banner
of national resources planning.
The social scientists who came to Washington soon after Franklin
D. Roosevelt became President had already amassed a great deal of data.
The Brookings Institution published four reports in 1933 that, in the midst
of depression, presented an optimistic picture of the nation's accomplishments and economic strengths. At the Department of Agriculture, remarkably productive individuals in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics had
published detailed regional economic studies; the monographs of some
academic historians and economists complemented those efforts. 26 However, the enterprise most germane to national planning was the two-volume, 1,500 page Review of Findings, published by President Herbert
Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends. In the best Progressive
spirit, with its emphasis on rational management, Hoover had established
this committee in September 1929, to identify America's natural resource,
demographic, social, and cultural problems and to suggest appropriate
remedies. The Rockefeller Foundation paid for the work, and the SSRC
supplied many of the participants. Hoover, once a practicing engineer, selected Wesley C. Mitchell, a professor of economics at Columbia University, to chair the committee. He had known Mitchell since his days as
Secretary of Commerce, when Mitchell had directed the department's
Bu27
reau of Economic Research. Merriam became the vice-chairman.
The Review of Findings said surprisingly little about water development, except to call for the development of hydropower. 28 However, it
did urge economic planning. "Thousands of experts from thousands of
places" were needed. 29 The task was admittedly difficult, but the commit25. Karl, supra note 24, at 66-72, 102-08; M. Clawson, New Deal Planning: The National
Resources Planning Board 60-61 (1981); T Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Tnes of
Harold L. Ickes, 1874-1952 at 106-08 (1990).
26. Clawson, supra note 25, at 33-34; H. Taylor & A. Dewees Taylor, The Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932 at 277-325 (1952).
27. Karl, supra note 24, at 209-211. Mitchell began his professional career at the University
of Chicago.
28. The President's Research Committee on Social Trends, Review of Findings (1933). See
J. Greenan, American Civilization Today: A Summary of Recent Social Trends (1934) (a
shorter version intended for school and college use).
29. Research Committee on Social Trends, supra note 28, at xxxi.
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tee thought the effort should be attempted, beginning with "modest
schemes." 30 The report even broached the idea of establishing a National
Advisory Council to deal with basic social problems. It drew special attention to activities that undermined good government, such as lobbying organizations that represented economic rather than political interests,
large-scale economic mergers, and poor political leadership. However,
there was a positive note. In the last few decades, "the expert has been recognized because his utility and indispensability in the practical
operations
31
of the government," a trend the committee clearly endorsed.
With the advent of the New Deal administration of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, a major conduit between social scientists and the
executive branch became the National Planning Board (NPB). Secretary of

Interior Ickes established this board in July 1933, as an advisory panel for
the Public Works Administration that he directed. It subsequently underwent several name and organizational changes. 32 The President's uncle,
Frederic A. Delano, chaired the NPB. Delano was a supporter of regional
and park planning, former member of the Federal Reserve Board, and
chairman of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Based

on Ickes' recommendations, Roosevelt appointed Merriam and Mitchell to
the board's other two positions. The appointments suggested at the very
least that the decisions of the Committee on Recent Social Trends, which

Merriam and Mitchell had headed, were not objectionable to the new
Democratic Administration. Charles W. Eliot II, formerly the city planner
for the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, became the exec33
utive secretary of the NPB.

The Social Science Research Council was anxious to become involved in New Deal planning. In response to a request from Merriam, Wil30. Id.
31. Id. at Lxi. Other and more popular writers such as Stuart Chase and George Soule also
supported centralized planning, and the historian Charles Beard even advocated five year
plans, such as existed in the Soviet Union. All these proponents were justifiably concerned
that their views be summarily dismissed as socialist or even communist rhetoric. Graham,
supra note 11, at 16-21.
32. The social science component was actually more in evidence in some of the board's
work not focusing on water, such as land, mineral, science, and long-range work and relief
policies. Merriam, The NationalResourcesPlanning Board;A Chapterin American PlanningExperience, 38 The Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1075-88 (1944) (for a good overview of how the NPB and its
successor boards actually operated).
33. J. Christie, Morris Llewellyn Cooke: Progressive Engineer 133 (1983); R. Platt, Floods
and Man: A Geographer'sAgenda, in 2 Geography, Resources, and Environment: Themes from
the Work of Gilbert F.White 34 (R. Kates & I. Burton eds. 1986) (Platt's essay is one of the relatively few by social scientists that explicitly uses a historical approach); A. H. Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940 at 354-55 (1957);
Clawson, supra note 25, at 60-65; Warken, supra note 12, at 44-46; Watkins, supra note 25, at
376-78; Merriam, supranote 32, at 1075. According to B.Karl, Mitchell was appointed on the
recommendation of Louis Brownlow, head of the Public Administration Clearing House in
Chicago and, arguably, Merriam's closest friend. Mitchell left the NRB in December 1935.
Karl, supra note 24, at 235.
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liam F. Ogburn, the University of Chicago sociologist, who was serving as
president of the SSRC, organized a SSRC committee to draft a memorandum for the National Planning Board on the uses of social science for national planning. Reflecting orthodox social science philosophy, the report
pointed out that national plans "must recognize human adjustments as
their ultimate goal" and social science can "rescue public policy from the
vagueness and inexactness which have commonly characterized it in the
past."34 The authors' main point came in the concluding sentence. "With
its pivotal position among the social sciences, [the SSRC] could undoubtedly render valuable aid, if called on to do so, in the formidable task of national planning." 35 In fact, members of the SSRC pressed their views at
every opportunity. Utilizing SSRC funds that came from the Rockefeller
and other foundations, they held numerous academic conferences and selectively invited government officials. A healthy symbiosis occurred between New Deal planners and social scientists.
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, REGIONALISM,
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING
Many SSRC-sponsored gatherings focused on the subject of regionalism, a subject of interest to both professors and politicians. New
Deal administrators embraced the concept because they believed that national policies based on regional needs andpriorities would result in better integrated and more economical plans. 36 The concept was not static.
Regions would change over time in response to social shifts, as would the
types of administrative organization. However, regardless of this elasticity, fundamental issues still needed analysis. Within academia, anthropologists studied the extent to which culture defined a region. Ecologists-a
number of geographers among them-looked at plant and animal populations (including humans). Howard W. Odum of the University of North
Carolina led a phalanx of sociologists doing regional investigations. 37 Historians' interest in regional studies dated back to Frederick Jackson Turner's "Frontier Thesis" of 1893. Charles Beard's popularization of economic
history stimulated interest in comparative regional and class studies. Ag34. Memorandum Prepared for the National Planning Board by a Committee of the Social
Science Research Council: The Aid Which The Social Sciences Have Rendered and Can Render to National Planning (June 1934) (William F. Ogbum papers, box 26, folder 8, UC).
35. Id.
36. See National Resources Committee, Regional Factors in National Planning and Development 197-201 (1935); Graham, supra note 11, at 312.
37. H. Odum, The Regional Approach to National Social Planning, With Special Reference
To A More Abundant South and its Continuing Reintegration in the National Economy
(1935); H. Odum & H. Moore, American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to
National Integration (1938).
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ricultural economists and historians made major contributions after the
turn of
the century, as did city planners, who supported local history
38
work.
Certainly, an important stimulus to regional studies was the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in May, 1933. It was the
first manifestation of Roosevelt's commitment to comprehensive regional
natural resources planning.3 9 The President wanted planning "not just for
ourselves but planning for the generations to come, tying in industry and
agriculture and forestry and flood prevention, tying them all into a unified
whole. 40When sending the Tennessee Valley Authority legislation to Congress in April 1933, Roosevelt noted, "[miany hard lessons have taught us
It is time to extend
the human waste that results from lack of planning ...
planning to a wider field, in this instance comprehending in one great
project many States directly concerned with the basin of one of our greatest rivers. "
For social scientists, the TVA became a vast social experiment in
which they could test hypotheses against the reality of an emerging administration for an area four-fifths the size of England. Questions abounded. Did the TVA administer a cultural, geographic, or natural resource
region? What objectives should the TVA have and how did the new administration threaten traditional institutions and patterns of life? Were the
engineering solutions economically efficient and socially beneficial
throughout the basin, and did they address both short- and long-term
and more became a small
needs? Papers and conferences on these subjects
42
industry within the social science community.
The TVA itself did much to promote regional studies. It funded research at several southern universities, nearly all of which related to social
science. In the post-World War II period, the pace of research accelerated.
In 1952, for instance, the TVA contributed technical assistance or funds to
17 studies. Subjects included the ways states administered resource programs, the impact of land use changes on the black population, studies on
local leadership, an examination of the phosphate fertilizer industry, and
labor resource studies. 43 Industrial and university organizations initiated
38. See W. Ogbum's notes (undated but sometime in the 1930s) (Ogburn papers, box 26,
folder 7, UC). See also Taylor & Taylor, supra note 26, at 285-325.
39. J.Arnold, The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act 24 (1988); Graham, supra note
11, at 21.
40. F. Roosevelt, Speech in Montgomery, Alabama (Jan. 21, 1933), in 1 Franklin D.
Roosevelt & Conservation, 1911-1945 at 133 (E.Nixon comp. and ed. 1957).
41. Id. at 151 (Roosevelt to the Congress, Apr. 10, 1933).
42. See letter from Burgess to E. A. Bott (Apr. 11, 1934); Letter from Bott to Burgess (Apr.
14,1934); and Burgess's undated notes on the proposed TVA conference (Burgess papers, box
20, folder 4, UC) (for a list of some SSRC conferences and a discussion of Ernest Burgess's
plans for a TVA conference in 1934).
43. Paper by A. Maass for the SSRC, Resource Research in the Southeast United States and
Texas (Nov. 1952). (Arthur Maass papers, folder 12, OH, HQ USACE)
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research that complemented the TVA studies. The Institute for Research in
Social Science, founded by Howard Odum in 1924 at the University of
North Carolina, provided much of the leadership.
Another important stimulus was the Committee of the South of
the National Planning Association, headed by Duke University economics
professor Calvin Hoover. While regional studies also became commonplace in other areas of the country, the South clearly dominated the field.
This was not simply the result of TVA promotion or the interest of a number of state universities (and legislatures). It also reflected the concern of
resources had not been
thoughtful Southerners that an area rich in natural
44
proportionately rich in economic opportunities.
The emphasis on regional studies led to questions about river basin planning. In December 1935, the National Resources Committee, a bureaucratic descendant of the National Planning Board, completed its study
of regional factors in national planning. Focusing on the TVA,the committee reported, "The watershed area has both advantages and disadvantages
as a region for planning and development purposes." 4 5 No area was more
suitable for planning and administering water control functions, such as
navigation and flood control, but matters relating to hydropower, land
utilization, agriculture, industry, and transportation, the committee concluded, "cut across the boundary of the drainage basin." 46 The committee
made an important point. Both the ability to define unambiguously the
drainage basin and the escalating, often conflicting, claims on water
helped promote multipurpose river basin planning. However, when basin planners addressed social and economic issues unrelated to water control, political divisions often became more important than physical ones.
Among social scientists, geographers tended to be most enthusiastic about multipurpose river basin planning. Harlan H. Barrows, the influential head of the University of Chicago Geography Department, of
whom we shall have more to say, was a major New Deal proponent. "The
basic objective in water planning," he said in 1938, "should be the coordinated control and development of water, both surface water and underground water, for all useful purposes in proper balance ....substantial
progress in dealing with the major water problems of the Nation is contingent upon acceptance of the river basin as the normal unit area in planning
and in the execution of plans." 47 Another outspoken advocate was Edward A. Ackerman, who joined the University of Chicago Geography Department in the late 1940s and shortly thereafter took leave to serve first
44. Id.
45. National Resources Committee, supranote 36, at 111.
46. Id. at 113.
47. Speech by H. Barrows, Fundamental Principles of Water Planning, at the annual convention of the National Reclamation Association (1938) (Merriam papers, box CCXI, folder 1,

UC).
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with the Bureau of the Budget and then with the TVA.In 1950, along with
a number of other social scientists, he served on the staff of President Harry S. Truman's Water Resources Policy Commission, which recommended
that river basin commissions be established for all major basins.48 The following year, he emphasized to the Connecticut Resources Council that
"there is one thing crystal clear to me about the future management of our
water resources: major river basins should be planned for and managed as
units."49 He encouraged his fellow geographers to engage in regional
analysis and advanced several techniques and conceptual models for their
consideration. 50 Implicit in Barrows' and Ackerman's enthusiasm was the
assumption that water is the key resource that can unify a region and improve quality of life.
Other social scientists were less enamored of river basin planning,
even if they may have conceded theoretical advantages. Political scientists
such as Arthur Maass recommended changes in the federal planning
structure, pointing to the need for better interagency coordination and
more accurate technical data, but they grew frustrated over congressional
resistance to basic organizational changes. 51 While doubting that natural
units such as river basins could serve as decision arenas, political scientists
also expressed reservations about units based strictly on economic efficiency. Certainly, case studies of various forms of river basin administrations provided political scientists with useful insights about the
development of public policy and formation of governmental organizations, but it also showed that political science had limited application as a
predictive tool; such tools seemed more the province of geography and
52
economics.
Agricultural economist S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup of the University of
California, Berkeley, questioned the utility of river basins as administrative units. He noted in 1946 that "the economic importance of physiographic features may change over time" and indicated that technological
advances tend to reduce the importance of such features. 53 Subsequently,
48. The President's Water Resources Policy Commission, A Water Policy for the American
People 10-11 (1950).
49. Speech by E. Ackerman to the Connecticut Resources Council, (Nov. 29, 1951) (Personal copy in author's file and additional copies can be found in the Edward A. Ackerman
papers, accession 5363, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY.).

50. Ackerman, Regional Research-EmergingConcepts and Techniques in the Field of Geography, 29 Econ. Geography 189-97 (1953).
51. Maass, Congressand Water Resources, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 576-93 (1950).
52. H. Hart, The Role of Political Science in Water Resources Management (c. 1970) (Hart
was professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin; Maass papers, folder 106,
OH, HQ USACE). This unpublished paper is evidently an early version of Hart, supra 6, at
122-63 (the chapter footnotes provide readers with a good basic bibliography of political science case studies written in the period 1950-71).
53. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Administrative Coordination of Conservation Policy, 22 J. Land & Pub.
Utility Econ. 58 (1946).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

he refined his views. By 1960, he had concluded that "the physical and economic interrelations that make the watershed a unit in the social sciences
operate largely on the side of production and not on the side of consumption." 54 Once policymakers shift their attention from production-whether of hydropower, timber, or grain-to consumption, the watershed
model is compromised. The economic consequences of alternative courses
of action within the basin must then be reexamined. Inevitably, the two
objectives of regional and national development intercede and possibly
conflict.
Perhaps of more concern to social scientists than the efficacy of regional planning approaches was the small impact regional studies seemed
to be having on water resources planning in the 1950s. Despite new information on economic well-being, industrial and agricultural growth, and
labor markets, the selection of a federal water project relied principally on
showing whether it was economically feasible in terms of its stated direct
purposes-flood control, irrigation, navigation, etc. Contributions--or
limits-to social well-being usually were considered only as an afterthought. 55 In 1962, Gilbert F. White, then president of the Association of
American Geographers, lamented that "geography's voice in policy making is modest beyond the experience and refinement of analysis which it
has to offer." 56 Ackerman observed that the profession's "relative national
place in policy advice by scientists has declined greatly by comparison to
twenty years ago." 57 Ironically, these statements came the same year the
geographers, and other social scientists, won a significant victory.
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy approved major changes in
federal water policy. The changes were published in Senate Document
97.58 Among other matters, the new policy emphasized river basin planning and-following a recommendation of a Senate Select Committeeset a goal of developing comprehensive plans for all the major river basins
by 1970. 59 President Lyndon B. Johnson pursued Kennedy's objectives. In
54. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Philosophy and Objectives of Watershed Policy, in Economics of Watershed Planning 2-3 (G. Toley & F. Riggs eds. 1960).
55. G. White, A Perspectiveof River Basin Development, in 1 Geography, Resources, and Environment: Selected Writings of Gilbert White 56 (R. Kates & L Burton eds. 1986) (originally
published in 22 Law &Contemp. Probs. 157 (1957)).
56. White, CriticalIssues ConcerningGeography in the Public Service-Introduction,52 Annals
of Ass'n Am. Geographers 279 (1962).
57. Ackerman, Public Policy Issues for the Professional Geographer,52 Annals of Ass'n Am.
Geographers 295 (1962) (emphasis in original).
58. The President's Water Resources Council, Policies, Standards, and Procedures in The
Formulation, Evaluation, and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and
Related Land Resources, S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The President's Water
Resources Council should not be confused with the United States Water Resources Council
that Congress established in 1965.
59. Id.; Letter from D. Bell, Director, Bureau of the Budget, to Honorable C. Vance, Secretary of the Army, (June 4,1962)(copy in William J.Donovan papers, folder on "Comparehensive Planning-Early 1960s," OH, HQ, USACE).
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response, federal water resources agencies conducted seminars and conferences and reorganized their workforce in order to increase competence
in the social sciences, especially in economics.
The 1965 Water Resources Planning Act accelerated these efforts.
The act created a Water Resources Council of the secretaries of Interior;
Army; Agriculture; and Health, Education, and Welfare; and the chairman
of the Federal Power Commission. Among other things, the council was to
establish standards and procedures to guide federal participation in river
basin planning, that is, to develop benefit-cost guidelines. Furthermore,
the act authorized the President to establish river basin commissions of
state and federal representatives, and it also authorized federal grants to
the states to assist in the development of river basin programs. 60 By 1973,
six river basin commissions had been formed.6 1
Increased emphasis on basin-wide economic analysis caused the
Corps of Engineers and other water agencies to change the composition of
their professional staffs. Between 1963 and the end of 1965, the Corps increased the number of economists in its field offices from 51 to 77, of
whom about half were "reasonably well trained," according to the Corps'
chief economist. 62 Still, about 90 percent of the personnel involved in planning activities were engineers.6 Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor
wrote, "It is in the interest of the Nation, of the Department of the Army,
and of the Corps of Engineers that the civil works planning organization
include a far larger number of, and a distinct role for, economists and others with a professional education and background in water resources
planning."64 The Corps quickly reacted. By August 1967, the number of
Corps economists had increased to 119, with persons selected for ten more
positions and recruitment proceeding for another twenty. 65 In April 1969,
a further step was taken when the Chief of Engineers established an Institute for Water Resources with responsibilities to monitor and perform research in all phases of water resources planning and "to develop new and
60. See generally D. Welborn & J.Burkhead, Intergovernmental Relations in the American
Administrative State: The Johnson Presidency 132-36 (1989) (for more on the Water
Resources Planning Act); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, History of the
Implementation of the Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on National Water
Resources, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969) (prepared by T. Schad & E. Boswell).
61. The six commissions were New England, Great Lakes, Pacific Northwest, Ohio, Missouri, and Upper Mississippi. A Souris-Red-Rainey commission formed in 1967 was incorporated into the Upper Mississippi Commission in 1973.
62. Letter from J. Johanson, Resources and Civil Works Division, Bureau of the Budget, to
E. Staats, Director, Bureau of the Budget (Sept. 24,1965) (folder on "Corps of Engineers", box
159, Series 61.1A, Record Group 51 (Bureau of the Budget), National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C.).
63. Senate Comm. on Public Works, Report to the Secretary of the Army by the Civil Works
Study Board, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (Comm. Print 1966).
64. Id. at VII (Letter from S. Resor to the Chief of Engineers (Oct. 28, 1965)).
65. J. Moore & D. Moore, The Army Corps of Engineers and the Evolution of Federal
Flood Plain Management Policy 84 (1989).
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innovative techniques, giving particular attention to environmental quality, regional development, and interregional and international planning."66
But political realities prevented the realization of comprehensive
river basin planning. The Bureau of the Budget remained suspicious of the
Water Resources Council and did not always cooperate. Commission
heads did not exert strong regional leadership, federal agencies disagreed
about procedures, the number of council meetings declined, and the council never was accepted as a "court of last resort" for basin concerns. Local
support also dwindled as people became more concerned with urban water supply, wastewater treatment and environmental problems. Finally,
strains on the federal budget precluded appropriations for large water
projects and contributed to the splintering of traditional water resource
constituencies. In November 1981, President Ronald Reagan abolished the
six river basin commissions. One year later, he dismantled the Water Resources Council. 67
Politics aside, New Deal advocates of river basin planning may
have insufficiently appreciated a basic fact: the success of regional administration depends on accurately defining problems, developing priorities,
and finding solutions that actually can be implemented. To do this successfully requires planners to predict and measure a large number of diverse costs and benefits involving economic, institutional, social, and
environmental developments. Unfortunately, there is little in the record to
68
suggest that either natural or social scientists do this particularly well.
This being the case, political and financial factors determine and fragment
the planning process. As a concept that addresses all potential functions,
rather than simply attempting to identify all significant constituencies,
comprehensive river basin planning remains elusive.
66. M. Reuss, Shaping Environmental Awareness: The United States Army Corps of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board, 1970-1980 at 5-6 (1983). According to personnel office
records, in 1990 the Corps employed 212 economists, 171 geographers, 96 political scientists,
and 94 sociologists, as indicated by the major undergraduate field.
67. Paper presented by H. Caulfield, Jr., Fulfilling the Promises of the Water Resources
Planning Act, at the 25th annual meeting of the Interstate Conference on Water Problems
(Sept. 18,1984). The Office of Water Policy was also finally abolished. See N. Wengert, A Critical Review of the River Basin as a Focusfor Resources Planning,Development, and Management, in
Unified River Basin Management: Symposium Proceedings 22-25 (R. North, L. Dworsky &
D. Allee eds. 1980) (Norman Wengert's analysis of the decline of interest in river basin development is similar to this author's).
68. W. Donovan, Economic, Social, and Environmental Requirementsand Related Considerations
in Planningfor Waterand Land Resources, in I Proceedings: Social Scientists Conference 14-34
(United States Army Corps of Engineers ed. 1977). Donovan at the time was chief of the plan
formulation and evaluation branch, planning division, civil works directorate, Office of the
Chief of Engineers.
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NEW APPROACHES TO RIVER BASIN PLANNING:
THE INFLUENCE OF HARLAN BARROWS AND GILBERT WHITE
Charles Merriam opened government doors for a number of his
colleagues at the University of Chicago during the New Deal. Partly because of Merriam, Burgess, Ogburn, and Ruml all became involved in
NRB activities. Geography professor Charles C. Colby and education professor Charles H. Judd served on NRB technical committees. In water issues, however, Harlan Barrows was the most important person Merriam
brought to Washington.
Along with Carl Sauer of the University of California at Berkeley,
Barrows stressed that geographers should be time- as well as space-oriented, and both willingly left the study of purely physical landforms to others. However, unlike Sauer, who concentrated on cultural inquiries
reaching back into antiquity, Barrows studied economic interactions behis colleagues to peer into
tween humans and the natural world and urged
69
the future and look at long-term changes.
In 1933, Barrows became one of three non-engineers appointed to
the eight-member Mississippi Valley Committee (MVC) which the NRB
established to study water problems in the Mississippi River drainage basin.70 The following year, he asked one of his graduate students, Gilbert F.
White, to work for him in Washington. 71 His work for Barrows decisively
influenced White and, through. White, the evolution of floodplain management in the United States.
The MVC's October, 1934, final report detailed and endorsed a
number of policies and programs to bring multipurpose development to
the entire Mississippi River Valley, with a special emphasis on rural electrification, the pet interest of committee chairman Morris Cooke. With
Cooke's urging, the committee argued that many economically marginal
72
projects would become practicable if hydropower were added to them.
Showing Barrow's thought and felicity of expression, the report eloquent69. Platt, supranote 33, at 32-33; Ackerman, supra note 50, at 190; A. Goudie, The Human
Impact on the Natural Environment 5-6 (1986); Telephone interview with Gilbert White (June
28,1990).
70. Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, Final Report of the National Planning Board, 1933-1934 (Aug. 1, 1934) (copy in Merriam papers, box CLXXI, folder 6, UC). The
two other non-engineers were Harlow S. Person, an economist from New York City, and
Henry Solon Graves, former director of the Yale University School of Forestry and Chief Forester of the United States Forest Service from 1910 to 1920.
71. Transcript, interview with Gilbert White (June 25,1985) (conducted by M. Reuss; OH,
HQ USACE); White, Geographersin a PerilouslyChanging World, 75 Annals of the Ass'n of Am.
Geographers 10-11 (1985); Platt, supra note 33, at 32; Moore & Moore, supranote 65, at 34-37.
72. Report by the Mississippi Valley Committee of the Public Works Administration 45
(Oct. 1, 1934). See transcript, interview with G. White (June 25,1985) (conducted by M. Reuss,
on Cooke's interest in rural electrification; OH, HQ USACE). See generally D. Brown, Electricity for Rural America: The Fight for the REA 35-46 (1980); Christie, supranote 33, at 133-65

(for more on Cooke).
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ly stated, "[p]lanning for the use and control of water is planning for most
of the basic functions of the life of the Nation .... Land, water, and people

go together... It is of little use to control rivers if we cannot thereby improve the quality of human living." 73 Barrows believed that good planning required linking land and water use, and he propagated the idea
many times in the following years.
In June 1934, Roosevelt created a National Resources Board (NRB)
to replace the National Planning Board. Unlike its predecessor, this new
board was outside of the PWA. The members were the secretaries of Interior, War, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; Federal Emergency Relief
Administrator Harry Hopkins; and Delano, Merriam, and Mitchell. In its
December 1934, report to the White House, 74 the NRB recommended that
the federal government initiate "detailed engineering, social, financial,
and legal studies of water projects" in seventeen drainage basins. 75 Echoing the Review of Findings, it also proposed the establishment of a permaagency to coordinate all planning policies of the
nent national planning
76
federal government.
The Mississippi Valley Committee became the Water Planning
Committee of the NRB and then, in June 1935, when the NRB was renamed the National Resources Committee, the Water Planning Committee became the Water Resources Committee (WRC). Each time there was a
name change, there were organizational modifications, but the missions
remained essentially the same. Merriam and Delano stayed on the National Resources Committee, and Beardsley Ruml and New England businessman Henry S. Dennison were added as advisors. Internationally-known
sanitary and public works engineer Abel Wolman headed the Water Resources Committee. Of the twelve men on the committee, Barrows and Ira
Gabrielson, Chief of the Biological Survey, were initially the only non-engineers. Gilbert White served as secretary.
The WRC divided the country into 115 drainage basin subdivisions and assigned 15 water consultants to analyze them. The results were
published in Drainage Basin Problems and Programs, which reached the
President's desk at the end of 1936. Responding to the President's request
to revise and refine its findings, the WRC established 45 drainage basin
committees throughout the country. Each committee submitted extensive
reports which listed recommended projects and costs. The revision, published in February 1938, contained proposals for a six-year integrated,
multipurpose program of construction and investigations that addressed
73. Report of the Mississippi Valley Committee, supra note 72, at preface, 3.
74. National Resources Board, A Report on National Planning and Public Works in Relation to Natural Resources and Including Land Use and Water Resources with Findings and
Recommendations (Dec. 1, 1934).
75. Warken, supra note 12, at 60.
76. Id.
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both traditional programs in flood control, irrigation, and navigation, and
alsoprojects for beach erosion control, recreational waters, and wildlife ar-

eas.7 The WRC advocated a national policy for pollution abatement,
greater federal responsibility for gathering hydrologic data, and some
changes in the procedures of water agencies, including the organization of
planning and construction-operation functions into separate agencies.
"More and more clearly it is seen," the committee wrote, "that only by
comprehensive attacks on the interdependent problems of unit areas, in

most instances drainage basins, can costly mistakes, far too common
through many years, be avoided." 78 The report favored cost-sharing 79 and
"a unified plan of water control and development"8° and urged the establishment of state planning boards-some of which were actually createdand the negotiation of interstate water compacts. Indeed, the administra-

tion and some congressmen attempted to pass legislation that would have
established regional river basin authorities, but all attempts ultimately
failed, largely because of congressional concerns that Congress's pre-

sumed legislative prerogatives may be eroded. 81 Regardless, the report
became the most comprehensive national multipurpose water plan produced during the New Deal.
With one notable exception, the drainage report reflected the engineering orientation of most of its authors and generally endorsed structural solutions to water problems. The exception was the report of the
Ohio-Lower Mississippi River Regulation Subcommittee, which Barrows
chaired. This section contained some remarkable language: "If it would
cost more to build reservoir storage than to prevent floodplain encroachment, all relevantfactors considered,the latter procedure would appear to be

the better solution." 82 For the first time, an official government document
recommended something other than building dams, floodwalls, and
levees to protect life and property. The report acknowledged the difficulty
77. National Resources Committee, Drainage Basin Problems and Programs (1938) (1937
revision). See summary by unknown author, The Evaluation Subcommittee of the Water
Resources Committee of the National Resources Planning Board (1941) (Merriam papers, box
CCLV, folder 4, UC); The National Resources Committee, Water Planning (Feb. 1938) (a 40page popular version of the WRC report); 7 Civil Engineering 167-77 (1937) (for earlier work
of the WRC); in particular, see Wolman, Resume of the DrainageBasin Study Report, 7 Civil Engineering at 167-171; and Fowler, The National DrainageBasin Study, 7 Civil Engineering at 17172.
78. National Resources Committee, supra note 77, at 3.
79. Id. at 97.
80. Id. at 7.
81. 1, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1911-1945 at 341 n.1 (E. Nixon comp. and
ed. 1957); Id. at 361-62 (letter from D. Bell, Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, to F
Roosevelt (Mar. 5,1935)); 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1911-1945 at 68-71 (E.
Nixon comp. and ed. 1957) (address from F. Roosevelt to Congress (June 3 1937)); W. Leuchtenburg, Flood Control Politics: The Connecticut River Valley Problem, 1927-1950 at 72-81
(1953).
82. National Resources Committee, supranote 77, at 70 (emphasis in the original).
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of molding nature's laws to man's: "Too often the habits of the rivers have
been ignored.... The lure of cheap land, low rentals, or other advantages
has prevailed despite the fact that man cannot flout the laws of nature with
impunity." 83 Barrows' subcommittee (which included the Chief of Engineers) recommended the consideration of zoning laws and relocation. It
warned that flood control reservoirs simply promoted the occupation of
previously flood-prone lands, and this inevitably produced new demands
for protection. The committee also proposed that flood insurance appraisals be used to determine the practicality of floodplain development.O' The
WRC's receptivity to the subcommittee report must have encouraged Barrows. The full committee explicitly noted that most of the subcommittee
recommendations applied equally to other basins85and were "essential elements in a sound national flood-control policy."
Barrows was not content to publish his views in the drainage report. He looked for definite changes in policy. He saw an opportunity
when President Roosevelt forwarded to the WRC in January 1938, a Corps
of Engineers document entitled "Information on Flood Control in the Mississippi River Basin." In it, the Corps of Engineers called for the construction of 82 reservoirs, primarily for flood control, in the Ohio and lower
Mississippi basins at a cost of a little over $700 million. This represented
an increase of 13 reservoirs and nearly $180 million over the Corps' recommendation in April 1937. Barrows wrote Wolman that further studies
were needed. Then he noted, "[t]he practicability of avoiding flood damages by zoning valley bottoms and by other remedial measures with respect to the86 occupation and use of flood plains has not been sufficiently
explored."
Wolman personally took Barrows' concerns to the President in
April, 1938. He told Roosevelt that if all the reservoirs proposed for the
Ohio Valley--over fifty-had been constructed, the only reservoir that
would have made a significant difference in the flood stage at Cairo
(where the Ohio emptied into the Mississippi) during the 1937 flood
would have been Gilbertsville, at the mouth of the Tennessee River. This
reservoir would have reduced the flood stage at Cairo by about two feet.
The other reservoirs combined would have reduced the Cairo flood stage
83. Id. at 70-71.
84. Id. at 71. Major General Julian Schley, the Chief of Engineers, had originally wanted to
put a disclaimer at the beginning of the subcommittee report: "General Schley neither

approves nor disapproves of the report." Id.at 69. However, he accepted the WRC's recommendation to incorporate the following sentence in the letter of transmittal: "As might be
expected, each member of a Committee of this size cannot concur with each and every part
of a report of this scope and character, but the report represents the consensus of opinion of
the Committee." Minutes of 35th Meeting of the Water Resources Committee (Jan. 8, 1938)
(Merriam papers, box XXIX, folder 9, UC); National Resources Committee, supranote 77, at x.
85. National Resources Committee, supra note 77, at 75.
86. Letter from H. Barrows to A. Wolman (Mar. 23, 1938) (Merriam papers, box CLXXII,
folder 16, UC).
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only a few inches. Repeating Barrow's message, Wolman87emphasized to
the attentive President that more studies were necessary.
Gilbert White wholeheartedly agreed with Wolman and Barrows.
While serving as secretary to the Water Resources Committee, White
chose the issue of floodplain occupance as his dissertation subject and took
the opportunity of discussing it with various officials from federal water
resource agencies. As early as 1936, he had suggested that changes in the
location and construction of buildings might be more economically advantageous than large flood control structures.8 8 He was particularly interested in two related questions. First, how would the construction of
water projects affect the surrounding population? Second, how does one
measure the social desirability of water projects? For instance, should it be
measured in regional or national terms? The questions were not simply academic. The Flood Control Act of 193689 determined that flood control
was a legitimate federal responsibility and that federal flood control
projects may be constructed "if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security
of people are otherwise adversely affected." 90 The problem was to develop a rational, equitable procedure to measure costs and benefits. 91 The
challenges were daunting. Who should determine what is in the national
interest, what does flood "damage" mean, and what constituted tangible
and intangible benefits? The legislation raised basic questions about the
proper role of government in developing natural resources and assisting
regional growth.
With a vast amount of data on hand, but with many questions unanswered, White began writing his dissertation. He finished it and received his degree in 1942. The dissertation was published in 1945.92 Water
resources planners were struck by White's forceful argument that flood
control involved "adjusting human occupance to the flood plain environment so as to utilize most effectively the natural resources of the plain,
and, at the same time, of applying feasible andpracticable measures for
minimizing the detrimental impacts of floods."9 White himself thought
87. Notes, Conference at the White House (Apr. 18, 1938) (Merriam papers, box CLXXIII,
folder 16, UC). Delano and Eliot also attended the meeting with the President. Barrows' subcommittee noted that if some 52 reservoirs proposed by the Army Engineers had been built
on tributaries of the Ohio above Louisville, Louisville still would have had a record flood in
1937, and Cincinnati would have suffered its worst flood in eighty years. Natural Resources
Committee, supra note 77, at 70.
88. White, The Limit of Economic Justificationfor Flood Protection, 12 J.Land & Pub. Utility

Econ. 133-48 (1936).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
90. 33 U.S.C. §701(a) (1988).
91. White interview, supra note 71; Moore &Moore, supra note 65, at 13
92. White interview, supranote 71; G.White, Human Adjustment to Floods, 29 U. Chi. Dep't
Geography Research Paper (1945) (dissertation published in a limited edition in 1942).
93. White, supranote 92, at 2-3. See Moore &Moore, supra note 65, at 36.
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his dissertation's most important insight was that "for any mode of resources management, finding the optimal use of a resource theoretically
involves canvassing the whole range of alternatives that are open to society, and then trying to estimate what the consequences would be, both favorable and unfavorable, of undertaking any one of those alternatives or
a combination of them."94 Flood control, according to White, involves adjusting "land occupance and floodplain phenomena in harmonious relationship." 95 A "geographical approach" to the problem "analyzes the
factors affecting the success of possible uses of a floodplain. It seeks to find
a use of the floodplain which yields maximum96returns to society with minimum social costs, and it promotes that use."
White's dissertation attracted immediate interest. Political scientist Arthur Maass cited it in his own dissertation, which was subsequently
published under the title Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers.97 In their 1955 book, Floods, William G. Hoyt and Walter B.
Langbein, two eminent U. S. Geological Survey employees, suggested that
White's thesis required serious consideration. 8 The TVA became the first
agency to take heed. By the early 1950s, the agency recognized that levees,
reservoirs, and floodwalls were often ineffective defenses against flood
damage. In 1953, TVA engineer James E.Goddard and geographer Aelred
J. Gray established a new "Community Flood Damage Mitigation Assistance Program", later renamed "floodplain management", to assist local
communities to develop land use controls that would lessen flood damages. Close and ongoing coordination between TVA planners and local residents was a key component of the approach. Technical data regarding the
probable size and frequency of floods had to be translated into language
understandable to non-engineers. Many TVA engineers were skeptical,
partly fearing that the public would place too much faith in technical data
that, though the best available, could not reliably predict future human de99
velopment or natural hazards.
The federal government as a whole accepted floodplain management slowly. Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47, distributed at the end of
1952, essentially reaffirmed the structural approach to flood control within
the constraints imposed by benefit-cost analysis, although it directed
agencies to consider all methods of controlling floods and reducing damages before selecting the most effective and economical choice. Section 206
94. White interview, supra note 71.
95. Id. at 34.
96. Id.
97. A. Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers 145-49 (1951).
98. W. Hoyt & W. Langbein, Floods (1955).
99. Transcript, interview with J. Goddard (Jan. 15,1986) (conducted by M. Reuss; OH, HQ
USACE).
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of the Flood Control Act of 1960100 authorized the Corps to disseminate information on floods and flood damages, including engineering advice to
local interests. New federal policy published in Senate Document 97 (1962)
specified that agencies were to address both nonstructural and structural
solutions to flood problems. 10 1 In 1966, the Bureau of the Budget organized a task force chaired by Gilbert White that analyzed the successes and
failures of the country's flood control efforts. Not surprisingly, the task
force emphasized the importance of nonstructural solutions to flood problems. It noted that flood damages were increasing despite the more than
$7 billion the federal government had invested in flood control projects
since 1936.102 Finally, President Jimmy Carter issued a set of executive orders and directives that emphasized the use of nonstructural floodplain
management practices in federal water resources planning. 103
Despite--or perhaps because of-sporadic federal encouragement, many communities remained unenthusiastic about floodplain management. Local civic leaders ignored evidence that traditional structural
approaches to flood control provided a false sense of security, and that human development in floodplains invited catastrophe regardless of the degree of structural protection. Concerned that economic development
might be curbed, they often sided with landowners who complained that
zoning regulations conflicted with basic property rights. Officials became
interested only after floods damaged buildings that they had unwisely allowed to be constructed in flood hazard areas. By that time, of course,
available remedies such as zoning restrictions were limited. Although
nonstructural measures have been instituted in some localities, the history
of flood control during the last thirty years shows that floodproofing, relocation, or restrictive zoning regulations may not be either politically or
economically acceptable at the local level. 1° 4

100. 33 U.S.C. § 709(a) (1988).
101. The President's Water Resources Council, supra note 58.
102. Moore & Moore, supra note 65, at 22, 40; Costa, The Dilemma of Flood Control in the
United States, 2 Envtl. Mgmt. 317 (1978); R. Burby & S. French with B. Cigler, E. Kaiser, D.
Moreau & B. Stiftel, Flood Plain Land Use Management: A NationalAssessment, in 5 Studies in
Water Pol'y & Mgmt. 6-8 (1985); House Committee on Public Works, A Unified National Program for Managing Flood Losses, H.R. Doc. No. 465,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
103. Exec. Order No. 11,988, May 24, 1977, Flood Plain Management, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,951
(1977); Exec. Order No. 11,990, May 24, 1977, Protection of Wetlands, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,961
(1977); Water Resources Policy Reform Message, June 6,1978,1 Pub. Papers 1050 (1978); Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Secretary of the Interior, Emphasis on
Nonstructural Flood Protection Methods (July 12,1978) (author's files, OH, HQ USACE).
104. Burby & French, supra note 102, at 52; Costa, supranote 102, at 317-18.
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MEASURING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS

OF WATER PROJECTS

The economist John V. Krutilla once candidly observed, "[elconomic analysis of benefits and costs of long-lived investments involve as
much art as science. " 105 This is particularly apparent in the public sector.
The corporation president can assess benefits in terms of costs and profits
accruing to the firm, but in the public sector the investment must be analyzed in terms of all costs and gains, including those charged to third parties. Both economic and social impacts become more difficult to formulate
and address. One consequence is that thousands of economists and engineers have spent decades developing and redeveloping federal benefitcost guidelines.
The necessity for benefit-cost guidelines became apparent once
the 1936 Flood Control Act 10 was approved, and both federal water agencies and the National Resources Planning Board attempted to draft recommendations. Beginning in 1943, when Congress effectively abolished the
National Resources Planning Board by denying it further funding, the
quadripartite Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee (FIARBC or
"Firebrick") assumed most of the responsibilities for developing technical
guidelines in federal water resources development. The origins of this
committee go back to 1939, when the Corps of Engineers, Department of
Interior, and Department of Agriculture agreed to exchange information
and views prior to submitting planning reports to Congress-a tentative
attempt at coordination that fell far short of the desires of the New Deal
planners. The Federal Power Commission joined the group in 1943.107
The member agencies ofFIARBC formed a number of subcommittees to address issues in hydrology, sedimentation, energy conversion
procedures, and benefits and costs. In 1950, the last-named subcommittee
published a report on ProposedPracticesfor Economic Analysis of River Basin
Projects, more commonly called the Green Book, that recommended procedures for evaluating benefits and costs of water projects. 10 8 In general,
it applied classical welfare economics to national water resources development. It addressed national benefits and costs for irrigation, flood control,
105. J. Krutilla, The Use of Economics in Project Evaluation, Transactions of the 40th North
American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, 1975 at 375 (1975), reprinted in
Resources for the Future 125 (no date).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
107. B. Holmes, A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 1800-1960 at 19-20, 23,
37-38 (1972) (United States Dep't of Agric. Econ. Res. Service misc. publication no. 1233);
Maass, supra note 97, at 110-11; United States Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Report of the
Chief of Engineers, 1951, H.R. Doc. No. 272, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 159 (1952).
108. Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee, Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs,
Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects (1950). The Green Book was
reissued in 1958 by President Eisenhower's Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources
(IACWR, or "Icewater").
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navigation, and power, but it did not develop procedures to analyze income distribution, environmental impacts, or regional benefits and costs.
It proposed that intangible effects (effects not measurable in monetary
terms), such as the saving of human life or the loss of scenic or historic sites
be "fully considered" and that federal water agencies develop uniform
procedures to address such effects. 109 Federal water agencies approved
the Green Book, but its recommendations were not binding, and both the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers rejected specific parts
of it. Then, at the end of 1952, the Bureau of the Budget published Circular
A-47, which decisively imposed national efficiency benefit-cost standards
on all federal water resources projects, despite the protests of many congressmen (and engineers) who desired a more flexible approach. 11U
An important but sometimes overlooked influence on the development of benefit-cost analysis was Resources for the Future (RFF), a nonprofit corporation established in 1952 to gather data and objectively to
assess the country's present and future natural resource requirements.
With funding from the Ford Foundation, the corporation assembled an
impressive staff of social scientists-mainly economists-and initiated a
wide-ranging research program. 1" Some early work was inspired by the
report of the President's Materials Policy Commission, chaired by William
S. Paley.' 1 2 The commission looked at the future resource needs of the free
world and recommended more research and data-gathering, improved
governmental organization to handle materials problems, and greater private investment. The report emphasized efficient management of growth
and addressed resources according to use. For instance, hydroelectric
power and waterway transportation were not considered in the context of
multipurpose river development but in relation, respectively, to other
power sources such as coal and oil and to other methods of transportation
such as highways. 113 The commission's recommendations, and many other ideas, became subjects of discussion at the Mid-Century Conference on
109. Id. at 26-28.
110. Id.; C. Howe, Water as an Economic Commodity, in Water and the American West: Essays
in Honor of Raphael J. Moses 58 (D. Getches ed. 1988); Holmes, supranote 107, at 39; N. Back

& R. Gidez, Economics in the Comprehensive River Basin Planning Program, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England Agric. Econ. Council, U. Mass. (1964)
(Donovan papers, box 19, OH, HQ USACE).
111. Henry Jarrett and others, A Brief History of RFF,in Resources for the Future: The First

25 Years 3-20 (1977). A scholarly history detailing the contributions of RFF to natural
resources policy is needed. The papers of A. Maass, G. White, and H. Caulfield, Jr, provide
much useful source material (OH, HQ USACE).
112. 12. The President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom (1952) (5
volumes).
113. The President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom: Summary of
Volume 1 (1952) (for a summary of volume I of the Paley Comm. report entitled, Foundations
for Growth and Security). Report by A. Maass to Social Science Research Council, in A. Maass
to P.Herring, Election Day (1952) (a critique of the Commission Study) (Maass papers, folder
12, OH, HQ USACE).
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Resources for the Future, a huge meeting of 1,600 organized by RFF and
held in Washington on December 2-4,1952. The assembly was consciously
intended to update Theodore Roosevelt's 1908 Governors Conference and
114
also to generate suggestions for further work by RFF.
In the coming years, RFF published dozens of books that examined natural resource issues in the United States. Marked by rigorous
methodology and analysis, the publications reflected the organization's
interest in relating resource wealth to quality of life and economic growth.
In 1958, RFF published Multiple PurposeRiver Development by John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein. 115 After analyzing a number of river basin developments, the authors concluded that an economically efficient water
resources program that takes into account all benefits and costs would
more than likely be of limited attraction to private investors. Public invest116
ment would be necessary.
Although not published by RFF, two other books appeared in
1958 that recommended changes in benefit-cost efficiency criteria to increase and, ideally, optimize social welfare benefits under budgetary con117
straints. The authors were Otto Eckstein and Roland McKean.
Attempting to justify public investments on the same grounds as private
enterprises, both writers paid close attention to analytical aids and the use
of market prices to determine costs and benefits. However, their methodology could not satisfactorily account for future institutional, technological, social, and economic changes or for intangible benefits. Consequently,
the authors failed to obtain the scientific authority which they clearly desired. Moreover, even conceding the desirability of optimizing social welfare, the question of how to achieve this remained. "Pareto Efficiency"-a
state in which no individual in society can be made better off without making someone else worse off-was a popular economic idea in the New
Deal, but basically naive, for few policy changes involve situations in
which absolutely no one loses. There were other methodological problems. Welfare economists emphasized individual market preferences, but
114. Resources for the Future, The Nation Looks At Its Resources: Report of the Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future (1954) (on the background to the conference, see
R. Gustavson's introduction; for the session on water resource problems, see pages 126-75.
Gilbert White, then president of Haverford College, chaired the session).
115. J.Krutilla & 0. Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development: Studies in Applied
Economic Analysis 265-77 (1958).
116. Id.; Fox, A Perspective on RFF Research, in Resources for the Future: The First 25 Years
80-81 (1977).
117. R. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis, With Emphasis on
Water Resources Development (1958) (Rand Corporation Research Study, Publications in
Operations Research No. 3); 0. Eckstein, Water-Resource Development: The Economics of
Project Evaluation (1958). See Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 54, at 9-12; Margolis, The Economic
Evaluationof Federal Water Resource Development: A Review Article, 49 Am. Econ. Rev. 96-111
(1959); Hines, The Economists Discover Water Resources, 14 J. Soil & Water Conservation 12526 (1959) (for comments on all three books, including Krutilla and Eckstein).
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this method downplayed community responses; an individual's best interest may not be the same as the community's. Also, the economists insisted
that the .social value of income generated by a water project remained the
same regardless of whether the project was located in a poor or wealthy
region; the social implications of this position bothered even the formulators and forced them to defer to the political process to accommodate economically inefficient-from their point of view-objectives.
Eckstein, Krutilla, and other "new welfare economists" left their
colleagues basically with the same conceptual tools they had always used.
Perhaps unintentionally, their analyses clarified more what economists
could not do than what they could. For the moment at least, economists remained bound to traditional benefit-cost analysis and its focus on maximizing economic efficiency or, in national terms, on producing "annual
additional income to the nation." 118 Meanwhile, political scientist Aaron
Wildavsky warned about the "the omission of explicit consideration of political factors" in benefit-cost analysis, 1 9 while another political scientist,
Vincent Ostrom, borrowed from economic theory to suggest that his colleagues assess the social "costs" of political decisions or indecisions in water resources use given various institutional arrangements. 120 The
common denominator was a belief that rational water allocation required
political as well as economic calculations.
The continuing debate in Congress and the Executive Branch1 21
over the appropriate way to determine costs and benefits of projects confused and frustrated engineers. Within the Corps of Engineers, responses
depended on position and office location. In the Washington, D.C. headquarters, more politically sensitive to policy shifts than many field offices
were, senior officials attempted to stay in step with new ideas and proce118. Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, in Water
Research 311-20 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1966); Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteriafor a System of Water Rights, in Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource
Development 263-66 (S. Smith & E. Castle eds. 1964); Howe, supra note 110, at 53-60.
119. Wildavsky, The PoliticalEconomy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis,
and Program Budgeting, in Pol, Sci. & Pub. Pol'y 63 (A. Ranney ed. 1968).
120. Ostrom, Water Resource Development: Some Problems in Economic and PoliticalAnalysis
of Public Policy, in Pol. Sci. & Pub. Pol'y 123-150 (A. Ranney ed. 1968); J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); M. Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965)
(Ostrom based his ideas partly on the work of these economists).
121. A detailed discussion of the various post-World War II political efforts to address and
rationalize federal water resources developments, especially in regard to benefit-cost calculations, is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Holmes, supra note 107, at 32-34, 4043; United States Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: The Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Annual Reports of the Council on Environmental Quality together with The
President's Message to Congress 96-100 (1990); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, History of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee on Water Resources, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1969) (prepared by T. Schad & E.
Boswell); M. Reuss, Reshaping National Water Politics: The Emergence of the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 (1991) (United States Army Corps of Engineers Institute
for Water Resources).
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dures. As early as 1950, Eugene Weber, a senior civilian in the Office of the
Chief of Engineers, told young Engineer officers, "[tihe land, labor and
material used for Civil Works projects are, in effect, being diverted from
other possible uses which might be more or less beneficial from the standpoint of satisfying human needs." 122 Such an admission from a professional engineer-planner would have been startling a generation before. In
late 1955, the Chief of Engineers established a Committee on Economic
Policies to develop policies and procedures relating to economic evaluation of projects. The committee turned to the 1950 Green Book for general
guidance. Subsequently, the Corps integrated the committee's new economic guidelines into a revised Engineering Manual for Civil Works published in October, 1956.123
However, Corps field offices did not respond altogether positively to this heightened interest in economic evaluation. One engineer from
the Corps' Seattle District office could not help smirking at the incongruity
between Krutilla's and Eckstein's sophisticated analysis of Corps plans for
projects on the upper Columbia and Snake rivers and the simple arithmetic computations done on scrap paper by Corps field engineers upon
which the analysis was based. 124 As he candidly admitted, Seattle District
planners "were not strong on economics.... our economist was an engineer who could not 'cut it' where project formulation was the order of
work. He was arbitrarily selected to do the economics in order to keep him
out of the hair of the project engineers. His assistant was a business administration major." 125 It is likely that the Corps' traditional engineering orientation resulted in some other Corps field offices treating economic
matters in similar ways.
Senior officials in Corps field offices may have been more responsive to Headquarters directives and to the principles of Senate Document
97,but they remained concerned that worthwhile projects were not being
built because of inappropriate economic evaluation. For instance, Brigadier General C. H. Dunn, Division Engineer of the Corps' Southwestern
Division, unsuccessfully argued to the Director of Civil Works in the
Wasnington, D.C. office, Major General Jackson Graham, that a 100-year
122. Lecture by E. Weber to the United States Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
(1950) (available in Civil Works Administration: Project Formulation, Justification and Cost
Allocation, Donovan papers, folder on "B/C Analysis, 11/47-8/59", box 89, OH, HQ
USACE).
123. See folders on Terminology of Economic Evaluation of Water Resource Projects (tentative draft; box 38) and OCE Committee on Economic Policies-Pre '58 Green Book (box 34,
Donovan papers, OH, HQ USACE).
124. M. Spero, Upper Columbia River Construction, McNary Headwater To Chief Joseph
Tailwater, and U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Seattle District, Upper Columbia Tributaries
Plan of Development Studies, 1952-1963 at X-20 (unpublished draft history, Spero papers,
OH, HQ USACE). Spero was one of Seattle District's planning group leaders on the Upper
Columbia. Krutilla & Eckstein, supra note 115, at 136-69.
125. Spero, supra note 124, at X-60.
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period be used for the economic analysis of navigation projects rather than
a 50-year period. 126 In another case, Major General George H. Walker,
head of the Missouri River Division, complained to Lieutenant General
William F. Cassidy, the Chief of Engineers, "[tihere is a marked lack of
consistency in our approach to economic analysis and our approach to
structural design." He noted that the Corps designs dam and reservoir
projects to "take full cognizance of the possibility of occurrence of the
maximum probable flood during the project life." 127 Yet, the additional
cost of this approach sometimes prevented projects from obtaining the
positive benefit-cost ratio needed before construction could commence. In
short, General Walker asked that economic evaluation methodology accommodate the safety and durability factors that the Corps believed necessary. 128 He may not have known or appreciated the arguments against
structural solutions that Gilbert White and others were then advancing.
Confusion over economic evaluation was not confined to government corridors. Indeed, some of the most vigorous debates occurred in
academia. At Harvard University in 1955, Arthur Maass (political science)
and Maynard Hufschmidt (public administration) initiated the Harvard
Water Program, a multidisciplinary research and training program to develop new methodological techniques in water resources planning. They
soon were joined by Harvard economics professors Robert Dorfman and
Otto Eckstein, economics student Stephen Marglin, and engineering professors Gordon Fair, Harold Thomas, Jr., and Myron Fiering. Besides some
Harvard graduate students, the program trained dozens of state and federal water resource officials. It initially received Rockefeller Foundation
support, but later also obtained financial assistance from the Army Corps
of Engineers, the Bureau 129
of Reclamation, the Public Health Service, and
Resources for the Future.
In 1962, the program's major participants published Design of Water Systems (see footnote 129), a work that profoundly influenced the ap126. Memorandum from Brigadier General C. Dunn to Major General J. Graham (Sept. 25,
1963) (entitled, Period of Economic Analysis for Navigation Projects); Memorandum from J.
Graham to C. Dunn (Oct. 28,1963) (same subject) (folder on Period of Economic Analysis for
Navigation Projects, box 38, Donovan papers, OH, HQ USACE).
127. Letter from Major General G. Walker to Lieutenant General W. Cassidy (July 30,1965)
(Jerome Ackerman papers, accession 6048, box 4, American Heritage Center, University of
Wyoming, Laramie, WY). Jerome Ackerman was the senior engineer in the Missouri River
Division. He was not related to the geographer Edward A. Ackerman,
128. Id.
129. Moore & Moore, supra note 65, at 47; Hufschmidt, The HarvardProgram:A Summing
Up, Water Research 441-43 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1966); M. Reuss, Water Resources People and Issues: Interview with Professor Arthur Maass 6 (1989); A. Maass, M. Hufschmidt, R.
Dorfman, H. Thomas, Jr., S. Marglin & G. Fair, Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning 10-13 (1962); D. Major, Multi Objective Water Resource Planning (1977) (Water Res.
Monograph 4). My analysis of multiobjective analysis in this article is largely based on these
sources.
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proach to the planning and design of river basin systems during the next
decade. The authors stressed the tremendous advantages of computer
simulations to examine the physical and economic consequences of alternative designs of water systems. They also advanced the idea of synthetic
or operational hydrology. This entailed using computer-generated data to
predict future hydrologic activity rather than relying solely on historical
records. While initially the method encountered resistance from some
Corps engineers, who had always used historical streamflow records,
"with some proselytizing by Thomas and Fiering," according to Maass,
"the technique came to be accepted."' 30 Finally, the study explained a new
approach to economic evaluation, multiobjective economic analysis.
Not to be confused with multipurpose planning, which focuses on
irrigation, flood control, navigation, etc., multiobjective analysis addresses
actual social objectives, such as income generation, food or industrial production, and regional development. More important, unlike benefit-cost
analysis, which always maximizes economic efficiency, multiobjective
analysis designs water systems to address all the objectives sought by the
planners, including noneconomic values such as environmental quality or
preserving a well-established ethnic neighborhood. The method recognizes that, after all the computer simulations have been run and mathematical
models constructed, the ultimate decision must rest in the political sphere.
Sophisticated equipment and methodologies can show the consequences
of choosing various options to reach an objective or combination of objectives, but politicians (or planners) must choose the objectives in the first
place and select among various options in the end. Trade-offs are necessary. As never before, multiobjective analysis showed the importance of
interdisciplinary cooperation in water resources planning.
Although dwindling enthusiasm for river basin development and
continual political and bureaucratic debates over implementation measures prevented multiobjective analysis from being firmly anchored in
federal procedures, many government water resource experts supported
the concept. 13 1 In 1961, the Bureau of the Budget asked Maynard Hufschmidt to chair a panel to recommend changes in federal procedures for
formulating and evaluating water projects. The opportunity allowed Huf130. Reuss, supra 129, at 9.
131. Perhaps one reason why many government bureaucrats embraced multiobjective
analysis was that it nicely complemented the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that the Bureau of the Budget imposed on most federal agencies in 1965. Both systems stress the importance of obtaining the most accurate, detailed information possible for
a number of years into the future. Both develop options, estimates of future needs, and priorities. Perhaps most important, both are intended to be management tools and not simply
economic analyses. A. Schmid, Public Appropriations Structure and Performance: The Case
of PPBS in Water Resources 8-10 (1970) (Rep. No. 153, Dep't of Agric. Econ., Mich. State U.);
A. Nelson, A History of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 4048 (unpublished draft, OH, HQ USACE).
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schmidt to disseminate some of the findings of the Harvard Water Program and to influence the process that led to the drafting of Senate
Document 97 in 1962.132 That document mandated that the three objectives of federal water planning should be (1) national economic development "and development of each region within the country"; (2)
preservation, including the "protection and rehabilitation of resources,"
recreational areas, and areas of scenic, scientific, or historical interest; and
(3) the "well being of people" which "shall be the overriding determinant."133 Multiobjective analysis was used in several federal river basin
studies, but the debate continued over the objectives and their implementation, especially among staff members of the newly-established Water
Resources Council. 134

In Section 209 of the Flood Control Act of 1970,135 Congress formally embraced multiobjective planning and specified four objectives for
federal water projects: regional economic development, environmental
quality, social well-being, and national economic development. Section
122 of the River and Harbor Act of 1970 required the Corps of Engineers
to "promulgate guidelines designed to assure that possible adverse economic, social and environmental effects relating to any proposed project
have been fully considered." 136 The agency completed the guidelines in
December 1972. Concurrently, the Corps' Institute for Water Resources
contracted with a number of outside experts to do social science studies.
Nevertheless, social scientists in Corps district offices were dissatisfied.
The guidelines did not settle disputes about either methodologies or fundamental questions, and the inability of social scientists in the field to obtain more funding for social impact studies left them with the impression
that the Corps did not assign a high priority to the subject. 137 One Corps
economist said in 1976, "[n]umbers cost money. Give me more money and
I'll give you more numbers. But we're told not to spend extra money on
these social impact numbers, not to generate the social numbers for alternative project designs but only in depth for one alternative."1 38 If true,
the reason for the attitude may well have been the engineers' frustration
at trying to respond to inexact results subject to numerous interpretations.

132. Hufschmidt, supranote 129, at 445-46.
133. The President's Water Resources Council, supranote 58, at 1-2.
134. Multiobjective analysis perhaps figured most prominently in the North Atlantic
Regional Water Resources Study, a Corps-directed study initiated in late 1965 and completed
in 1972. It covered the area from the James River basin in Virginia to the Maine-New Brunswick border. Major, supranote 129, at 58-62.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1962-2 (1988).
136. Pub. L. No. 91-611, Title I, § 122,84 Stat. 1823 (not codified).
137. S. Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy of Administrative Reform 98 (1984).
138. Id.
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The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was not enthusiastic about either the regional development or social well-being objectives
that Congress had embraced in Section 209. It attempted to limit the applicability of the former to only a relatively small number of poverty-stricken
regions, while, according to the first director of the Water Resources Council, it regarded the latter as a license to sociologists and others to link water
projects with "almost any other damn thing they could think of that struck
them as good, as interesting, as proper." 139 For its part, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the Principlesand Standards(P&S) that the Water Resources Council produced to implement the multiobjective
approach. 140 Reflecting OMB philosophy, these procedures established
national economic development and environmental quality as the two objectives in water resources planning. The other two "accounts," regional
development and social well-being, were relegated to "other beneficial
and adverse effects" to be considered "where appropriate". 141 Some congressmen were particularly concerned that insufficient attention was given to regional development. Finally, federal water agencies, though
receptive to multiobjective analysis, protested the ambiguous language in
the P&S and the amount of work the document imposed. For instance, a
literal interpretation of the P&S would require agencies to develop alternatives for every major assumption concerning the future. Moreover, the
Carter Administration's attempt to apply uniform, detailed evaluation
procedures for water planning met strong resistance from agencies such as
the Corps of Engineers because
it failed to recognize the need for flexibility
1 42
from agency to agency.
Continuing controversy over objectives and procedures lasted
into the 1980s. In 1983, the Reagan Administration published its Principles
and Guidelines (P&G) to replace the 1973 P&S. 143 While P&G retained all
four accounts, it required only national economic development. Generally,
the recommended project is the one offering the greatest net benefit to the
139. Transcript, interview with Henry . Caulfield, Jr. 74 (Aug. 16,1988) (conducted by M.
Reuss; OH, HQ USACE).
140. United States Water Resources Council, Water and Related Land Resources: Establishment of Principlesand Standardsfor Planning,38 Fed. Reg. 24,778 (1973). See N. Grigg, Water
Resources Planning 8-83 (1985); Reuss, supra note 121 (for more on the evolution of multiobjective analysis in the federal government).
141. United States Water Resources Council, supra note 140, at 24,782-83.
142. Disposition Form from W. Donovan to A. Shwaiko, chief, planning division, civil
works directorate, Office of the Chief of Engineers (Aug. 4, 1978) (subject: Revising the Principles & Standards in the Proposed WRC Planning Manual); Disposition Form from A.
Schwaiko to L. Blakey, Chief, Office of Policy, civil works directorate, Office of the Chief of
Engineers (Sept. 6, 1978) (subject: WRC Memorandum of Aug. 29, 1978, Implementation of
Presidential Water Policy Directives-The P&S Revisions; both in author's files, OH, HQ
USACE).
143. United States Water Resources Council, Economic and Environmental Principles and
Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (Mar. 10, 1983).
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nation consistent with protecting the environment. Whether this emphasis
on national economic development eliminates or constrains the trade-offs
that are fundamental to multiobjective analysis (leaving aside the issue of
capability) has been a thoroughly discussed and still
nonfederal financial
144
unresolved issue.
The debate over economic evaluation methodology undoubtedly
will continue. It raises issues that have existed since Burgess and others in
the 1920s challenged social scientists to discover social laws and utilize
them for society's benefit. While some philosophers, political scientists,
and economists have expressed concerns about ethical judgments inherent in economic evaluation, other social scientists clearly retain their vision of an administrative "rule of reason," unsullied by power politics or

the public will, which can impose rational criteria. However, in a democracy the experts rarely have the last word. Alleged administrative and economic efficiencies are habitually sacrificed to democratic values, and

planning includes a notion of justice that is not simply an abstract concept
but a necessary tool. This is especially so when planners face a large number of uncertainties-as is usually the case with water resources-without
the technology or data necessary to provide the basis for accurate, "scientific" answers. To cope with these uncertainties justly, planners need to be
aware of their own evaluative assumptions and ethical biases. Ultimately,
however, social values as expressed in the political process will be the arbiter in a democratic society.4 5

CONCLUSION
Today, social scientists emphasize socially feasible choices and
probable consequences. More often than not, their focus is not on develop-

ing formal criteria for policy decisions, but rather on organizing data to
provide a rational framework to address social issues. Although this goal

is less ambitious than developing criteria, and is far removed from the ear144. See T. Schad, Present Policies and Practices,in Social and Environmental Objectives in
Water Resources Planning and Management 12-18 (W. Viessman, Jr. & K. Schilling eds. 1986)
(for a pessimistic prognosis). But cf. E. Stakhiv, Achieving Social and Environmental Objectives
in Water Resources Planning:Theory and Practice,in Water Resources Planning & Management
107-25 (W. Viessman, Jr. & K. Schilling eds. 1986) (offering an approach which Stakhiv maintains retains the system of trade-offs). This article excludes consideration of the impact of the
Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (33 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988)), which stipulates much
greater nonfederal cost-sharing for the construction and maintenance of water projects. At
the very least, the Act makes water planning as dependent on nonfederal financial capability
as on a finding of net benefit to national economic development.
145. J.Byrne, Policy Science and the Administrative State: The PoliticalEconomy of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis: The Politics of Criteria 70-93 (F Fischer &
J.Forester eds. 1987); K. Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology 265-68 (1985); A. Kneese, S. Ben-David & W. Schulze, The Ethical Foundationsof BenefitCost Analysis, in Energy and the Future 59-74 (D. Maclean & P. Brown eds. 1982).
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ly twentieth century desire to provide unerring predictive tools for policymaking, it is more realistic. The technique offers opportunities to make
both socially and environmentally responsible decisions affecting future
generations.
Yet, the approach frustrates engineers. Engineers desire to gain
control over uncertainty, while social scientists concentrate on analyzing
uncertainty and its probable consequences. Engineers have definite
projects in mind and look for ways to build them; social scientists explore
community values to determine whether the projects should be constructed at all. In short, the engineers are product-oriented, while social scientists engage (and extend) the process.
Because of their professional orientation, social scientists are better attuned than engineers to the organizational culture of federal water
agencies in the environmental era. New laws, shifting public values, and
financial constraints compelled federal water resources agencies to focus
more on the planning process than they had in the two decades following
World War I. Unquestionably, the law that stimulated the most dramatic
change was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.146 Its requirement that federal agencies draft an environmental impact statement for
every major federal activity "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" forced agencies to hire both natural and social scientists and significantly lengthened the planning period for major
construction projects. 147 Other federal and state environmental laws likewise extended pre-construction planning. In a sense,148a credible, comprehensive planning process became a product in itself.
Of course, social scientists were among those most concerned that
significant options and impacts be considered before construction began.Today, they continue to influence planning procedures and to sensitize
planners to social impacts.Nevertheless, many of the objectives of Progressive and New Deal era social scientists have all but been abandoned.
Comprehensive river-basin planning had some early success, but the actual management of river basins has floundered in the face of political realities, and the various river basin planning commissions established
pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 have been abol146. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347 (1988).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). The environmental impact statement requirement probably
resulted in hiring more archaeologists than any other kind of social scientist since the
National Environmental Policy Act charged federal agencies to "preserve important historic,
cultural, and natural aspect of our national heritage." 42 U.S.C. § 4331, Title 1, section 101 (b)

(4).
148. The Corps of Engineers recently has established a life cycle project management system that eliminates some steps of a feedback, process-oriented planning model and utilizes
elements of a sequential, product-oriented (project-oriented) model. This approach emphasizes individual responsibility, particularly with the project manager. However, it is too early
to assess its effect on social scientists within the Corps.
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ished. Nonstructural flood control measures were utilized in some areas
of the country, but insufficient economic incentives apparently exist to insure that these measures are given equal weight with traditional structural
approaches. Federal water resource planners accept multiobjective analysis but continue to debate appropriate methodologies. Finally, social scientists no longer seek laws, but analyze social processes and develop
models that enhance our understanding of how these processes relate to
one another. More often than not, the future is portrayed in terms of probabilities and options. Indeed, there is some irony that social scientists appear to offer more when they are less "scientific," that is, less concerned
about objective laws of social behavior. It may be that as social scientists
gain more appreciation for the unique and the problematical, they will exploit more history and less theory.
Social scientists (and historians) must work to insure that engineers' understanding of social process is sensitive both to temporal and
spatial dimensions. Incorporating this understanding into the planning of
water projects has, of course, been the great challenge. Given continual demands that planning funds be reduced and the planning period shortened, it may be that social scientists should concentrate less on procedures
and more on changing the perspective of engineers, who still remain the
project managers. The challenge then becomes to convince engineers that
planning does not end with project construction but extends to the
project's short- and long-range human and environmental impacts. Engineers must establish an ongoing responsibility with the land and people
they have affected. To develop this relationship effectively, they must
thoroughly integrate the social sciences into the engineering process, for
no ethics of responsibility can neglect the social and environmental consequences of decisionmaking. The social scientists who examine the potential effects of water projects on human activity are vital participants in the
engineering process.

